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Abstract
This paper introduces a series of working papers (Lockton 2011a,b and 2012a-f) providing a back-
ground literature review of di￿erent disciplinary perspectives on behaviour, informing the develop-
ment of the Design with Intent toolkit (Lockton, Harrison and Stanton 2010a,b). In the ￿rst section
of the paper, Herbert Simon’s ‘scissors’ metaphor, and the relationship between context, cognition
and behaviour are discussed, while the remaining sections introduce some ecological psychology per-
spectives relevant to design for behaviour change, including Barker’s behaviour settings, ecological
interface design and Gestalt psychology principles.
1 Simon’s scissors: context and cognition
￿Human rational behaviour is shaped by a scissors whose blades are the structure of task
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor.￿
Herbert Simon, ‘Invariants of human behaviour’. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1990, p.1-
19.
This paper introduces a series of working papers (Lockton 2011a,b and 2012a-f) providing a background
literature review of di￿erent disciplinary perspectives on behaviour, informing the development of the
Design with Intent toolkit (Lockton, Harrison and Stanton 2010a,b). Between them, the papers cover
a diverse set of approaches to behaviour￿and how it might be in￿uenced￿with practically applicable
implications and insights for designers extracted. In the ￿rst section of the paper you are reading, parallels
with￿and implications of￿the relationship between context, cognition and behaviour are discussed,
while the remaining sections introduce some ecological psychology perspectives relevant to design for
behaviour change.
1.1 A useful metaphor
A framework which has proven useful in structuring the research process is to consider relevant discip-
linary perspectives loosely along the lines of Simon’s ‘behavioural scissors’ (Figure 1) mentioned in the
1Figure 1: An interpretation of Herbert Simon’s ‘behavioural scissors’
above quote, simplifying the two blades to be concerning ‘context’ and ‘cognition’ respectively (following
Clark, 2009). ‘Environment’ and ‘mind’ might be further simpli￿cations 1. The point behind Simon’s
metaphor is that just as a pair of scissors needs both blades to operate, understanding behaviour re-
quires an understanding of both context and cognition: focusing exclusively on one blade will not give a
complete picture. Design is well placed to address ‘where the blades cross’￿dealing with both context
and cognition.
Of course, all cognition necessarily occurs in a context, so the scissors are not a perfect metaphor for
‘how behaviour occurs’.2 Nevertheless, for helping to structure a literature review, the two blades have
been helpful in providing a simple ‘shape’ to the disciplines reviewed, especially since the scope of the
research has expanded over the course of the Design with Intent project.
1.2 Lewin’s equation
Returning to Simon’s scissors, one obvious parallel is with ‘Lewin’s equation’ (Lewin, 1935, p.241), part
of his ￿eld theory (1943):
B = f (P;E)
According to this, behaviour, in any situation, is a function of the person and his or her environ-
ment: ￿Lewin believed that the stream of activity we call human behaviour resulted from the continuing
interaction of factors within the person... with other external factors as they are perceived in a given
behavioural setting.￿ It is ￿the constellation or pattern of inner and outer in￿uences that he experiences￿
that determine someone’s behaviour (Ittelson et al, 1974, p.69). In Lewin’s treatment, the ‘environment’
expressly includes social factors as well as the physical, and this approach has been taken in the structure
of this literature review.3
1Along with the remainder of this paper, Lockton (2011a,b and 2012b) cover primarily the context blade, while Lockton
(2012c,d) cover the cognitive blade; Lockton (2012a,e,f) cover areas perhaps in the intersection of the blades, dealing with
both context and cognition.
2The work of Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g. Gigerenzer and Fiedler, 2004; see Lockton 2012d) provides an explicit
treatment of the ￿t between the blades: cognition and decision-making in context via the use of heuristics.
3Lewin also made use of the concept of channel factors, ￿apparently minor but actually important details￿ in the context
of situations which have the e￿ect of being ￿critical facilitators or barriers￿ (Ross and Nisbett, 1991, p.10). In a sustainable
2Jackson (2005, p.89), focusing speci￿cally on consumer behaviour, summarises the context / cogni-
tion distinction (though in the opposite order) in terms of how branches of psychology take di￿erent
approaches: ￿[T]here are￿broadly speaking￿two identi￿ably di￿erent kinds of approaches to under-
standing consumer behaviours... The ￿rst (‘internalist’) perspective carries an implicit assumption of
consumers as atomistic agents autonomous of social structure, while the second (‘externalist’) perspective
sees consumers as constrained operators programmed (or at least heavily in￿uenced) by external forces
beyond their comprehension or control.￿
1.3 The fundamental attribution error
The fundamental attribution error (e.g. Ross and Nisbett, 1991) is relevant here. This is, essentially, the
￿nding that ￿[w]e overestimate the degree to which other people’s behaviours are due to their personal
traits, and underestimate the degree to which they are caused by the situation￿ (Winter & Koger, 2004,
p.66). From a design point of view, this might be expressed in terms of assumptions that users will behave
in a certain way￿e.g. wasting energy￿because they are intransigent, or have the wrong attitude, rather
than because contextual factors make it easy to waste energy, or di￿cult to save it.
Conversely, when explaining variances in our own behaviour, we often emphasise context factors:
￿For example, when Deborah [Winter] sees a colleague drive his car two blocks to the library,
she explains the behaviour as laziness and a lack of awareness about environmental issues;
she’s less likely to attribute it to the possibility that he has to carry 14 books back. But
when she drives her car around the campus to the library, it’s obviously due to the situational
demand of returning so many books. ￿I’m not lazy, but he is￿￿ (Winter & Koger, 2004, p.66).
Lockton, Harrison and Stanton (2012) explore some of the assumptions that designers make when ‘mod-
elling’ users with a view to in￿uencing their behaviour.
1.4 Modelling behaviour
Many approaches to in￿uencing behaviour emphasise one blade or the other￿context or cognition. They
try to change the context in which people behave (e.g. making it easier or harder to behave in a particular
way) or try to change people’s thinking, so that they behave or don’t behave in a particular way. Design
often combines both approaches￿it can address both the context of behaviour and the way that people
perceive and make decisions about what to do.
Some more recent models of behaviour follow Lewin and do include both context and cognition, such as
the A-B-C model (Guagnano et al, 1995; Stern, 2000)￿developed in the context of a study of recycling￿
which incorporates both attitudes (A) and ‘external conditions’ (C) as determinants of behaviour (B).
The model results in an ￿inverted U-shaped function￿ (Stern, 2000, p.415) with the contextual factors C
‘trumping’ personal factors A as a determinant of behaviour B when they are very strongly positive or
negative, but A being the dominant variable a￿ecting B as C tends towards neutrality. Lockton (2012c)
addresses the importance of attitudes in behaviour change￿and how designers can a￿ect them￿in
more detail, including discussion of models such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (which emphasises
cognitive rather than contextual factors), while Lockton (2012d) looks in more detail at cognitive biases
and decision-making.
The remainder of this paper introduces some aspects of ecological psychology￿very much part of the
‘context blade’￿and how they might be relevant to design for behaviour change. Lockton (2011a,b and
behaviour context this may describe some of the oft-recognised gaps between ‘pro-environmental attitudes’ and actual
behaviour in practice (see Lockton 2012c). For example, someone holding an empty soft drink can may have the intention
to recycle it, but if a recycling bin is not available (the channel factor), it is likely it will not be recycled.
32012b) go into more detail on other aspects of context, how the physical and social environment and
the structure of situations is modelled as a￿ecting behaviour, in a number of psychological and other
disciplines. In each case, implications for designers are extracted￿techniques and insights which it may
be possible to apply through design to in￿uence behaviour.
2 Ecological and environmental psychology
Environmental psychology ￿deals with the reciprocal relationships between humans and the built and
natural environment￿ (Bell et al, 1996, p. v), which is broad enough a de￿nition to encompass a range
of areas of research. Of the ￿elds covered in this series of working papers, most of what has been
organised along the ‘context’ blade of Simon’s scissors￿with the probable exception of discussions of
digital architecture and social context￿would be considered to be within environmental psychology’s
scope.
Ecological psychology is usually de￿ned more narrowly, with its treatment of behaviour arising from
two main (separate) origins: Barker’s work on behaviour settings and Gibson’s on a￿ordances. A￿ord-
ances are probably the most fundamental ecological psychology principle from a ‘design and behaviour’
perspective, and as such are covered in detail in Lockton (2012b).
Within the scope of this section, only certain ideas from environmental and ecological psychology will
be considered where they are directly applicable to a design context.
2.1 Behaviour settings and environmental stimuli
Barker’s work on behaviour settings (Barker, 1968) explored how speci￿c ‘settings’ comprise both a
‘physical milieu’ and ‘standing patterns’ of collective behaviour. For example, a school classroom at a
particular moment ￿is bounded in space and time and has a structure which interrelates physical, social
and cultural properties so that it elicits common or regularized forms of behaviour. Barker’s objective
was to determine the relationships between what he calls the extraindividual pattern of behaviour￿that
is, the behaviour that all people en masse reveal in a behaviour setting￿and the structural properties
of that setting￿ (Ittelson et al, 1974, p.70). He uses the term synomorphic to describe behaviour that
is similar in structure to the physical milieu￿in a classroom with chairs in it, sitting behaviour is
synomorphic while lying down is not.
Price (1976) describes attempts to develop taxonomies of behaviour settings based on shared char-
acteristics, one of the advantages of which would be the ability to predict people’s behaviour in new
settings, given knowledge of the social and cultural characteristics of the situation. From a design for
behaviour change perspective, probably the most immediately salient idea to draw from Barker’s work
is the idea that designing particular settings could elicit particular behaviours, if the setting is similar to
ones in which the desired behaviours are normally expressed. Some work on problems such as reducing
dissatisfaction (and aggression) in hospital accident and emergency waiting areas (e.g. Design Council,
2011) involves e￿ectively trying to change the behaviour setting to one less likely to elicit undesirable
behaviour.
Chein (1954) felt that the ‘stimulus’ part of the then-dominant stimulus-response psychology (see
Lockton 2011a) had been under-explored theoretically, and aimed to ￿pull together a schema for taking
better account of the environment than is customary￿ (Chein, 1954, p.115). In his de￿nition, a stimulus
is ￿whatever is capable of initiating a change in the stream of activity; it is, so to speak, a release or
trigger mechanism￿ (p. 117). Beyond simply triggering a response, however, Chein classi￿es a number
of other behaviour-related functions stimuli can have. They can be: goal objects, ￿objects or situations
which can serve as need satis￿ers￿ (p.119); noxiants, which are painful or unpleasant; supports, ￿features
4of the environment which make particular behaviours feasible￿ (p.121); constraints, ￿features of the
environment which preclude particular behaviours, make their occurrences less likely, or limit their
variability￿ (p.121); or directors, features ￿which tend to induce speci￿c directions of behaviour￿ (p.123).
Overall, the presence or absence of these components in an environment determines the degrees of freedom
available to a person.
It is not clear the extent to which Chein’s di￿erent categories of components are mutually exclusive
(e.g., ‘directors’ would seem to include or overlap with many of the others), but they parallel many of the
other concepts relevant to design which emerge from the literature. Comparing Fogg’s Behaviour Model
(see Lockton 2012f), supports and constraints could be seen as the environmental parts of ‘ability’, a pre-
requisite for particular behaviours to occur￿and the goals and noxiants as environmental contributions
to Fogg’s ‘motivation’ component. Directors and stimuli in general (in Chein’s de￿nition) have parallels
with Fogg’s ‘triggers’.
2.2 Ecological interface design
Vicente (2002) and Burns and Hajdukiewicz (2004), among others, have developed the ￿eld of ecological
interface design (EID), incorporating an ecological psychology perspective into the process of designing
interfaces, mainly for complex systems such as nuclear power station control rooms, chemical plants and
intensive care units.
Helping users to understand the a￿ordances (Lockton, 2012b), and, especially, the constraints in
their environment is an important concept within EID. The basic aim is to make interfaces ￿ecologically
sound￿￿￿designed to re￿ect the constraints of the work environment in a way that is perceptually
available to the people who use it... This transparency of use, where users feel as if they are working
directly with the object and not with the interface, is the ‘holy grail’ of interface design￿ (Burns and
Hajdukiewicz, 2004, p.1-2).
While this goal of ‘transparency’ also recurs in other areas of interaction design, such as haptic and
‘natural’ user interfaces designed to simplify interaction (e.g. Microsoft’s Kinect and Surface), EID
focuses mainly on interfaces in ‘expert’ domains, where users need to deal with more information and
make often safety-critical decisions based on it, without error, reducing the cognitive demand of the
decision-making process by putting as much knowledge ‘in the world’ rather than requiring users to hold
it in their heads (using Norman’s (1988/2002) terminology. 4
Burns and Hajdukiewicz present EID as an alternative approach to the user-centred design paradigm
dominant in consumer product design and interaction design, concentrating on understanding and model-
ling the work domain￿in particular the constraints that exist, which de￿ne and limit the human activity
possible￿￿rst rather than starting with users themselves. It is argued that in many cases where systems
are complex, the user-centred design practice of ￿asking users [what they want] doesn’t work￿, although
this portrayal of user-centred design is perhaps something of a straw man as user research methods
continue to evolve.
Speci￿cally in the context of in￿uencing behaviour for social and environmental bene￿t, EID has been
applied to problems including reducing energy use and encouraging moderation in gambling. Vicente
(2006, p.114-8) describes Power Pig, a student project encouraging users to turn computer workstations
o￿ when not in use via a novel interface incorporating both metaphor (￿a race between the computer user
and the top energy conserver in the entire company￿) and an element of a￿ective design (see Lockton
2012c) in the sense that the user is represented as a cartoon drawing of a pig which changes from ￿a
4Indeed, one aim is to help ￿users to become experts￿ (Burns and Hajdukiewicz, 2004, p.7) through the way that
information is presented, reducing training needs and helping users develop more accurate mental models (St-Cyr and
Burns, 2002). When applied to behaviour change, this has parallels with elements of the EMPOWER project, discussed
in Lockton, Cain, Harrison et al (2011).
5fat ugly pig representing an energy glutton, to a slim, muscular, attractive pig representing an energy
conserver￿ as the user changes his or her behaviour.
Burns and Hajdukiewicz (2004) describe the application of EID to analyse the work domain of￿and
design a new interface for￿a video poker game, with the aim of helping problem gamblers improve
￿poor decision-making behaviour￿ (p.240) through both a ￿downward spiral visualization... suggest[ing]
that longer play is more problematic￿ (p.243), a metaphor of an ￿unfair race￿ to demonstrate that ￿the
house always wins and odds are set deliberately to favour the house... Regardless of the situation, the
house is always shown as advantaged over the patron￿ (p.244). In a similar vein to the pig example, a
metaphor of a dog represents the gambler, ￿changing from a suave ‘cool dog’ to a ‘dirty dog’ rummaging
through trash when the gambler has exceeded his allowable losses￿ (p.244). It is recognised that the
gambler and the house have di￿erent objectives; this perhaps makes the gambling context more complex
than the energy example. It is interesting that both examples make use of elements (such as the animal
characters) widely used in a number of other behaviour change projects (e.g. Dillahunt et al’s (2008)
virtual polar bear) although with a di￿erent approach to analysing the ‘problem’ in the ￿rst place.
3 Perception and Gestalt psychology
￿Perception is of de￿nite and probable things￿
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890, Chapter XIX
Perception is an area of considerable interest in environmental and ecological psychology, as it is in
human factors research generally. Gibson’s a￿ordances and later additions and clari￿cations of the
concept by Norman and Gaver (see Lockton 2012b) all involve questions of perception and how decisions
are made (consciously or otherwise) about what actions to take based on that perception. Technological
developments such as thermal imaging can allow enhanced perception or shifting of stimulus perception
from one sense to another (Giacomin, 2010) with potential for in￿uencing behaviour through new kinds
of salient feedback.
Brunswik (1956) saw environmental stimuli not simply ￿as a source of stimulation but as a source of
information from and about the environment￿ (Ittelson et al, 1974, p.73), in a way perhaps paralleling
some of Shannon’s ideas (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). In Brunswik’s ecological cue validity model, a
person perceives cues in his or her environment, which are ‘sampled’ and combined to make probabilistic
inferences about what the actual properties of the environment are, with the inferences becoming more
accurate the more sampling occurs over time in a kind of Bayesian process. Brunswik uses the metaphor
of a lens which focuses (combines) the diverse cues present in an environment onto a single, resultant
probability. Cues’ ecological validity is ￿their objective trustworthiness as potential indicators of mech-
anical or other relatively essential or enduring characteristics￿ (Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953, p.20). The
characteristics do not have to be purely physical: Brunswik (1956, p.50) includes ￿social stereotypes￿
within the scope of the inference process, and Hammond (1998), in explaining the di￿erences in validity
of cues suggests, for example, contrasting ￿the ecological validity of the cue ‘height of forehead’ with the
cue ‘vocabulary level’ as indicators of a person-object’s intelligence￿ to illustrate that one cue is probably
more valid than the other.
From a pragmatic design perspective, Brunswik’s cues might be seen as a kind of probabilistic per-
ceived a￿ordance or sum of a￿ordances about a situation; the speci￿c practical application might be in
ensuring that the cues present in a situation are consistent or aligned in a way that suggest they are
matched to the behaviour that we are trying to in￿uence; or, indeed, simply in recognising that in an
unfamiliar situation, users’ perceptions of a￿ordances may be to a degree probabilistic (￿It looks like this
6might do X￿) based on experience with analogous situations elsewhere. Design can be used to support
those inferences and give users con￿dence in their decision-making when engaged in new behaviours.
3.1 Gestalt psychology: the behavioural environment
￿On a winter evening amidst a driving snowstorm a man on horseback arrived at an inn,
happy to have reached a shelter after hours of riding over the wind-swept plain on which the
blanket of snow had covered all paths and landmarks. The landlord who came to the door
viewed the stranger with surprise and asked him whence he came. The man pointed in the
direction straight away from the inn, whereupon the landlord, in a tone of awe and wonder,
said: ￿Do you know that you have ridden across the Lake of Constance?￿ At which the rider
dropped stone dead at his feet.￿
Kurt Ko￿ka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology, 1935, p.27-8
Gestalt psychology is an approach to perception which emerged in the early 20th century, not speci￿cally
focused on behaviour, but with many implications for, and applications in, design. According to K￿hler
(1930, p.148), ￿[i]n the German language...the noun ‘gestalt’ has two meanings: besides the connotation
of ‘shape’ or ‘form’ as a property of things, it has the meaning of a concrete individual and characteristic
entity, existing as something detached and having a shape or form as one of its attributes.￿ Gestalt
psychology thus deals with ￿what is perceived [as] the whole, whether an object, a person, an event, or
a physical setting... Any event, object, behaviour or experience consists of the patterned relationship
among the various parts￿ (Ittelson et al, 1974, p. 67-8).
Ko￿ka (1935) uses the Lake Constance story quoted above to introduce the idea that the geograph-
ical environment (a frozen lake) was not the same as the behavioural environment which the rider per-
ceived (a barren plain). ￿His behaviour was a riding-over-a-plain, but not a riding-over-a-lake,￿ (Ko￿ka,
1935, p.28) hence his fright upon realising what he had done. This concept￿the behavioural environ-
ment￿essentially means the environment as mediated by perception, central to the gestalt approach.
Behaviour can only be understood by considering the environment as it is perceived, as a whole, together
with the person perceiving it. There are parallels with Barker’s behaviour settings (discussed above).
3.2 Gestalt psychology: the laws of perception
However, the contributions of gestalt psychology which have had most impact in design, primarily visual
design, are the ‘gestalt laws of perception’, or ‘principles of organisation’, observationally derived heur-
istics dealing with the perception of forms and patterns and inferences drawn from them. These appear
in a number of forms and have been developed and extended by authors subsequently to their original
framing; Tables 1 and 2 provide a brief summary of some as commonly phrased, drawing on Wertheimer
(1923), K￿hler (1930), Ko￿ka (1935), Boeree (2000), Lidwell et al (2003), Todorovic (2008) and Soegaard
(2010)￿in particular, some of the principles which seem to o￿er applicability in the design for behaviour
change context.
The main applicability is in terms of in￿uencing users’ perceptions: deliberately using similarity
(perhaps) to suggest that two controls should be operated together, or drawing users’ attention to
particular parts of an interface, or deliberately breaking symmetry to distinguish otherwise identical,
adjacent controls which should be operated separately, as in the illustration of part of a nuclear power
station control panel that Norman (1988/2002, p.95) uses, in which two knobs have been distinguished
by ￿xing the handles from di￿erent beer kegs over them.
7Table 1: A selection of some commonly cited gestalt principles with possible applicability to design for
behaviour change
Pr￿gnanz Translated as ‘succinctness’ or
‘conciseness’, the law of pr￿gnanz is
￿a tendency to interpret ambiguous
images as simple and complete,
versus complex and incomplete￿
(Lidwell et al, 2003, p. 120). The
concept pervades many of the other
gestalt principles￿a stimulus will be
perceived as being as ‘good’ a ￿gure
as possible.
In this image, ￿it is not three
self-enclosed areas but rather The Factor
of the ‘Good Curve’ which
predominates.￿ (Wertheimer, 1923)
Proximity The law of proximity suggests that
￿when we perceive a collection of
objects, we will see objects close to
each other as forming a group.￿
(Soegaard, 2010)
The dots ￿form pairs in which
spontaneously the nearer ones unite.￿
(Ko￿ka, 1935, p. 164)
Similarity The law of similarity ￿claims that
elements tend to be [perceived as]
integrated into groups if they are
similar to each other.￿ (Todorovic,
2008)
￿[W]e see the circles and triangles as
forming four horizontal rows (or at least
some con￿guration where triangles and
circles are grouped depending on their
shape). Objects similar to each other
thus tend to be seen as a unit.￿
(Soegaard, 2010)





The principle of the ￿gure-ground
relationship ￿asserts that the human
perceptual system separates stimuli
into either ￿gure elements or ground
elements.￿ (Lidwell et al, 2003, p.80)
Generally what is perceived as the
￿gure receives the observer’s focus,
but in some circumstances the
relationship is unclear and can
‘￿ip-￿op’ as in the famous ‘Rubin
vase’ optical illusion.
￿With exactly the same constellation of
stimuli we may have two di￿erent forms,
either a cross consisting of four slender
arms or a cross (like that of an order)
containing four large sectors.￿ (K￿hler,
1930, p.152; diagram modi￿ed to add
black shading)
Symmetry The law of symmetry suggests that
when ￿we see two unconnected
elements that are symmetrical, we
unconsciously integrate them into
one coherent object￿ (Soegaard,
2010). ￿Symmetry signi￿es far more
than mere similarity of parts; it
refers rather to the logical
correctness of a part considered
relative to the whole in which that
part occurs.￿ (Wertheimer, 1923)
￿Despite the pressure of proximity to
group the brackets nearest each other
together, symmetry overwhelms our
perception and makes us see them as
pairs of symmetrical brackets.￿ (Boeree,
2000)
9A number of other gestalt principles and developments of them are probably also relevant, but to
a lesser degree, such as the laws of closure, convexity, common fate, continuation and uniform connec-
tedness, and some work on auditory gestalten; the overarching law of pr￿gnanz suggests that users will
identify patterns where they are present, in whichever way is simplest or most concise, thus the designer
should try to ensure that these patterns are the ones intended. In some cases, the ‘completeness’ aspects
of gestalt can be deliberately employed, e.g. Ehrnberger and Broms’ (2007) ‘Puzzle Switches’ are pat-
terned light switches which are visibly disordered when switched on, reminding users to switch them o￿
when leaving the room by being obviously ‘out of place’ or ‘unresolved’ until dealt with.
Behrens (1998) suggests that ￿one of the reasons artists embraced gestalt theory is that it provided, in
their minds, scienti￿c validation of age-old principles of composition and page layout￿; certainly, graphic
designers and more recently interaction designers have internalised many of these principles to the extent
that they may seem ‘obvious’. Behrens also makes much the same point with gestalt’s ￿in￿uence in the
￿eld of psychology [itself. It] is unobtrusive in the sense that its ￿ndings have all been absorbed by more
recent viewpoints and because most of the prominent gestalt psychologists have either retired or died.￿
4 Implications for designers
 The concept of behaviour settings suggests the possibility of redesigning particular settings to
elicit particular behaviours, if the new setting is similar to ones in which the desired behaviours
are normally expressed.
 Interface design could help users understand the a￿ordances and constraints available in their
environment, in a way where users ￿feel as if they are working directly with the object and not
with the interface￿.
 Designers should ensure that the cues present in a situation are consistent or aligned in a way that
suggest they are matched to the behaviour that it is intended to in￿uence.
 Design can support users’ inferences about a situation and give them con￿dence in their decision-
making when engaged in new behaviours.
 Gestalt principles could be used to in￿uence users’ perceptions, e.g. deliberately using visual
similarity to suggest that two controls should be operated together.
 The law of pr￿gnanz suggests that users will identify patterns where they are present, in whichever
way is simplest or most concise, thus the designer should try to ensure that these patterns are the
ones intended.
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